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One of the most dramatic-and ethically problematic-episodes in the history of science involved the making and use of the first atomic weapons. When key discoveries of things like atomic fission and the chain reaction were made during the revolution in physics under way during the first half of the twentieth century, the scientists involved realised that the new knowledge gained might be used for both good purposes (for example, energy production) and bad purposes (for example, weapons making). 2 The first atomic bombs were developed soon after the discovery of the chain reaction in particular. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II caused hundreds of thousands of deaths. 3 Since that time vast resources (which might have been used for other purposes) have been devoted to nuclear weapons production, and humanity has lived under the threat of nuclear holocaust for decades.
An implication of the contemporary scientific revolution in genetics and biotechnology is that the life sciences, at present, are in a situation analogous to that of physics when the key discoveries mentioned above were made. The very same biological discoveries that might be used to benefit humanity (for example, via advances in medicine) can sometimes also be used to cause harm (for example, via biological weapons). In some cases, the harms in question could be catastrophic. This is thus a key moment in the history of biology-and a crucial time for ethical decision-making and policymaking in the life sciences. Research with potential to be used for both good and bad purposes is now commonly referred to as 'dual-use research'. While almost any knowledge and technology can be used for both kinds of purposes, the expression 'dual-use research of concern' 4 is used to refer to research that can be used for especially harmful purposes-that is, where the consequences of malevolent use would be potentially catastrophic. Of particular concern are advances in genetics that might enable development of a new generation of biological weapons of mass destruction. (In the remainder of this chapter, I will use the expression 'dualuse research' as shorthand for the expression 'dual-use research of concern'.)
Controversial cases
Such danger is illustrated by the following controversial studies that have been published during the new millennium.
The mousepox experiment
Australian scientists used genetic-engineering techniques to insert an interleukin (IL-4) gene into the mousepox virus. Their aim was to develop a strain of mousepox that would make mice infertile-and thus provide a potentially powerful new means of pest control. They unexpectedly discovered, however, that the altered virus killed both mice that were naturally resistant to and mice that had been vaccinated against ordinary mousepox. They published these findings, along with description of materials and methods, in the Journal of Virology in 2001. 5 A danger is that the same techniques might enable production of vaccine-resistant smallpox. Smallpox is one of the most feared biological weapons agents-and vaccine is our only defence against it.
Synthetic polio
Following the map of the polio genome (published on the Internet), American scientists (via mail order) bought and strung together corresponding strands of DNA. Addition of the synthesised genome to 'cell juice' (a solution containing cellular ingredients, but no live cells) led to production of 'live' polio virus that paralysed and killed mice. The scientists' aims were, inter alia, to show that Virology, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 1205-10. such a feat would be technically possible and to demonstrate that viruses are ultimately just chemicals.
6 They published their findings, along with description of materials and methods, in Science in 2002. 7 A danger is that similar techniques might be used to create biological weapons agents, such as smallpox, which bioterrorists and/or state-sponsored biological weapons programs might not otherwise be able to access easily.
Reconstruction of 1918 Spanish flu
American researchers used similar techniques (to those used with polio) to reconstruct the 1918 Spanish flu virus. The virus they created was more deadly to chickens than any flu virus that had previously been studied. The purpose of this research was to yield knowledge that would facilitate protection against possible future influenza pandemics-for example, vaccine production. They published their findings, along with description of materials and methods, in Science in 2005. 8 A danger is that malevolent actors (for example, bioterrorists) might use the published information to create and unleash the virus in question-which was responsible for one of the worst epidemics in human history, killing 20 to 100 million people over the course of a year or two.
Transmissible H5N1
The most recent and, to date, most controversial dual-use life-science research involved the study of H5N1 (avian) influenza transmissibility among ferrets, which provide the best model for influenza in humans. While it is estimated that H5N1 kills 60 per cent of humans infected, it is not (currently) transmissible between humans. Researchers in the Netherlands and the United States thus conducted experiments that aimed to determine whether H5N1 might develop into a human-to-human transmissible strain. Genetic engineering of the virus and 'passaging' of the altered virus between ferrets led to creation of strains that were airborne and easily transmissible among ferrets-thus indicating that natural evolution of a human-transmissible strain of H5N1 might be possible. Much debate surrounded the question of whether or not this research should be published in detail. On the one hand, it was argued that publishing these studies was important because this would facilitate vaccine development and/ or surveillance of relevant changes to H5N1 occurring in nature. The hope with regard to surveillance is that this would enable earlier detection of emerging ', Science, vol. 310, no. 5745, pandemic strains and thus earlier implementation of protective measures. On the other hand, others argued that a human-transmissible strain of H5N1 could kill millions or perhaps even billions of people if produced and unleashed by bioterrorists or other malevolent actors (or in the event of accidental release from research laboratories). The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in December 2011 recommended that the findings of these studies be published, but that detailed description of materials and methods be omitted from the published articles.
9 After a highly publicised World Health Organisation (WHO) meeting reached the opposite conclusion in February 2012-recommending that the studies eventually be published in full 10 -the NSABB reversed its initial decision in March 2012.
11 Revised (fully detailed) versions of the papers in question were finally published in Science 12 and Nature 13 in June 2012. Part of the reason for the NSABB's reversal of decision apparently involved misunderstanding regarding whether or not the airborne transmissible strains were deadly to ferrets. While much of the initial public discussion indicated that the strains produced in the Netherlands were just as deadly as ordinary H5N1, it was later revealed that airborne strains created in the lab were not deadly to ferrets. Another cited reason for the NSABB's reversed decision is that the revised manuscripts they eventually approved provided additional data regarding ways in which the studies might have public health benefits-for example, via surveillance.
Levels of governance
The dual-use phenomenon requires ethical decision-making by various actors at different levels of the science governance hierarchy. Individual scientists (insofar as they are at liberty) must decide what research to conduct and/or publish. Research institutions (insofar as they are at liberty) must decide how to regulate potentially dangerous research within their confines; how to educate 13 Imai, M., Watanabe, T., Hatta, M., Das, S. C., Ozawa, M., Shinya, K., Zhong, G., Hanson, A., Katsura, H., Watanabe, S., Li, C., Kawakami, E., Yamada, S., Kiso, M., Suzuki, Y., Maher, E. A., Neumann, G. and Kawaoka, Y. 2012 , 'Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets ', Nature, vol. 486, researchers working there (regarding dual use and/or ethics); what laboratory security measures to put into place, and so on.
14 Professional societies must make decisions about the development, promulgation and/or enforcement of ethical codes of conduct for scientists-and/or decisions about relevant (ethical) education of their members. Publishers must make decisions regarding processes of review of papers posing dual-use dangers-and they must ultimately decide which papers to publish. National governments must decide what research to fund, and the extent to (or manner in) which things like research review, publication review and/or relevant education of scientists will be mandatedand they must make decisions about the extent to which controls should be placed on access to potentially dangerous materials. International governance bodies (such as the WHO), finally, must make relevant decisions concerning global policy-for example, whether or not there should be international guidelines regarding dual-use research, or oversight thereof, and/or what the content of such guidelines should be.
Ethical dilemmas
In all cases the decisions will be difficult. On the one hand, responsible actors will want to take actions that will promote the development and use of beneficial science. On the other hand, they will want to take actions that will prevent the malevolent use of science (which might sometimes require avoidance of generation and/or publication of potentially dangerous information). An implication of the dual-use phenomenon, however, is that it is inherently difficult to achieve both goals at the same time in the cases where the very same research that is likely to be beneficial might also be used to cause harm. In the case of governmental decision-making, for example, a laissez-faire approach to scientific governance might facilitate scientific advance and the benefits thereby enabled-but it might also lead to especially dangerous research getting done and/or published. A more restrictive approach, on the other hand, might prevent generation and/or publication of dangerous information-but it might also stifle beneficial scientific advance at the same time. Hence the expression 'dual-use dilemma'.
In any case, it is important to recognise that key decisions posed by dual-use research are inherently ethical in nature. The decisions faced by the various actors enumerated above largely concern: 1) the responsibilities of the actors in question (for example, to what extent would a scientist be responsible if her research is used to cause harm?); 2) issues of how one should go about promoting benefits while avoiding harms or reducing risks (for example, should a paper be published if this has a good chance of promoting a significant amount of human wellbeing but a small chance of causing disaster?); and/or 3) questions about values and value conflict (for example, how should governments strike a balance between the goal to promote scientific freedom/progress and the goal to promote security?). Issues regarding responsibilities, harms, benefits and values-and, ultimately, what ought to be done-are exactly the kinds of things that ethics is about.
In the meantime, however, much of the debate about dual-use research has involved scientists and security experts rather than ethicists in particular.
